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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
Florea Ciupangel, a citizen of Romania who is of Roma ethnicity, seeks review of 
the BIA’s final order of removal.  The BIA affirmed an Immigration Judge’s denial of 
Ciupangel’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture.  The Board agreed with the IJ’s determination that 
Ciupangel had not established a pattern or practice of persecution of the Romani 
population in Romania.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.1 
I. 
Ciupangel claims that the IJ failed to properly apply the standard for persecution 
and that it focused only on evidence of physical violence against Ciupangel’s family and 
Roma rather than the many non-physical harms Roma face.2  We review questions of law 
de novo, including whether the correct legal standard was applied.3   
Ciupangel is incorrect in claiming that the IJ erred in resolving his claim of 
persecution in its January 29, 2020 decision.4  The IJ defined persecution as “a threat to 
 
1 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
2 We note that Ciupangel also asks us to clarify the systemic, pervasive, or organized 
standard.  Petitioner’s Br. at 35 (“[T]he systemic, pervasive or organized standard lacks a 
clear legal definition, making application more difficult and misapplication more 
likely.”).  We decline to do so at this time as it is not necessary for the resolution of this 
case. 
3 Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 519 F.3d 143, 146 (3d Cir. 2008). 
4 Ciupangel refers to this decision as the January 30, 2020 decision; it is captioned 
January 29, 2020 and signed on January 30, 2020. 
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the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a 
way regarded as offensive” and appropriately applied that definition to the facts.5 
Ciupangel’s assertion that the IJ “focuse[d] exclusively” on the physical harms is 
also belied by the record.6  The IJ noted that police violence against Roma “is one of the 
principal human rights concerns in Romania today,” but the IJ also addressed the 
evidence Ciupangel provided and explicitly concluded that “discrimination and 
mistreatment of Roma as it relates to housing, employment, education, and health care . . 
. do[] not rise to the level of persecution contemplated under the Act.”7   
Ciupangel did not satisfy his burden of establishing that such harm is sufficient to 
constitute a pattern or practice as required to qualify for relief from a removal order.  To 
amount to a pattern or practice, persecution must be “systemic, pervasive, or organized.”8  
We have explained that persecution under the INA includes “threats to life, confinement, 
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or 
freedom.”9  However, “[g]enerally harsh conditions” do not constitute persecution.10  
“Persecution is an extreme concept” and “[a]busive treatment and harassment, while 
always deplorable, may not rise to the level of persecution.”11   
 
5 App. 29 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985); Li v. Atty Gen., 400 
F.3d 157, 164-68 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
6 See Petitioner’s Br. at 34. 
7 App. 32. 
8 Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005). 
9 Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  
10 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
11 Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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We appreciate the Romani’s economic disadvantages, lack of access to education 
and health care, and unequal access to legal remedies.  However, we agree with the BIA’s 
conclusion that such deprivations do not rise to the level of a pattern or practice of 
persecution.  Courts have found that Roma who face similar deprivations, discrimination, 
and marginalization in other European counties do not face a pattern or practice of 
persecution.  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained: “There is no 
doubt that the Roma are victims of pervasive discrimination in employment, education, 
health care, and housing, and are occasionally the targets of violence.  But there is no 
indication that the Bulgarian government sanctions this conduct.”12 
Ciupangel argues that the Roma in Romania suffer from economic disadvantages 
and deprivations to a greater degree than members of the Romanian majority in Romania. 
We have no reason to doubt that assertion.  However, by way of comparison, we have 
held that: 
In the aggregate, a fine of more than a year and a half’s salary; blacklisting 
from any government employment and from most other forms of legitimate 
employment; the loss of health benefits, school tuition, and food rations; and 
the confiscation of household furniture and appliances from a relatively poor 
family constitute deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage 
which could threaten [the] family’s freedom if not their lives.13  
  
 
12 Georgieva v. Holder, 751 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). 
13 Li, 400 F.3d at 169. 
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This record does not establish that the deprivations that Romani face reach that level.14  
For example, while in Romania, Ciupangel completed high school and received a 
vocational education.  He was also able to find work in the form of “day jobs.”15   
We do want to emphasize that we do not doubt that Romani face widespread 
discrimination in Romania, and we are not unsympathetic to the deplorable conditions 
and discrimination they face.  However, the law does not allow us to conclude that the 
BIA erred in concluding that those deprivations do not amount to threats to life or 
freedom in the asylum context.   
II.  
For the foregoing reasons, we must therefore deny Ciupangel’s petition for review 
of the BIA and IJ’s decision.  
 
14 Ciupangel provides that “72% of [the Romani] have no drinking water at home, 59% 
live in segregated neighborhoods, 27% receive education in segregated schools, and [the 
Romani] have a life expectancy that is seven years less than the general population.”  
Petitioner’s Br. at 19 (emphasis in original).  While these conditions are deplorable, they 
do not rise to the level described in Li. 
15 App. 44. 
